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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
We assess the effect on savings behavior of several different 401(k) plan
features, including automatic enrollment, automatic cash distributions,
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employer matching provisions, eligibility requirements, investment op-
tions, and financial education. We also present new survey evidence on
individual savings adequacy. Many of our conclusions are based on an
analysis of micro-level administrative data on the 401(k) savings behav-
ior of employees in several large corporations that implemented changes
in their 401(k) plan design. Our analysis identifies a key behavioral prin-
ciple that should partially guide the design of 401(k) plans: employees
often follow the path of least resistance. For better or for worse, plan
administrators can manipulate the path of least resistance to powerfully
influence the savings and investment choices of their employees.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last 20 years, defined-contribution pension plans have gradu-
ally replaced defined benefit pension plans as the primary privately-
sponsored vehicle to provide retirement income. At year-end 2000,
employers sponsored over 325,000 401(k) plans with more than 42 mil-
lion active participants and $1.8 trillion in assets.1
The growth of 401(k)-type savings plans and the associated displace-
ment of defined benefit plans have generated new concerns about the
adequacy of employee savings. Defined contribution pension plans
place the burden of ensuring adequate retirement savings square on the
backs of individual employees. However, employers make many deci-
sions about the design of 401(k) plans that can either facilitate or hinder
the employees' retirement savings prospects. Although the government
places some limits on how companies can structure their 401(k) plans,
employers nonetheless have broad discretion in their design.
Making good plan design decisions requires an understanding of the
relationship between plan rules and participant choices. In this paper, we
analyze a new data set that enables us to carefully assess many such
relationships. The data set is compiled from anonymous administrative
records of several large firms that collectively employ almost 200,000 indi-
viduals. Many of these companies implemented changes in the design of
their 401(k) plans. These plan changes enable us to evaluate the impact on
individual savings behavior of institutional variation in 401(k) plan rules.
A list of the companies studied in this paper, along with the plan changes
or other interventions that we analyze, appears inTable 1Appendix A
gives a brief description of the data analyzed for each company.
1See EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits at http://www.ebri.org/facts/12OOfact.htm.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































770Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
Because low employee savings rates have motivated planadministra-
tors to adopt many of the 401(k)-plan changesthat we discuss in the rest
of the paper, we start off in Section 2 with a discussionof savings
adequacy. Using new data from a survey that we designed, wefind that
two-thirds of employees believe that they are saving too littleand that
one-third of these self-reported undersavers intend to raisetheir saving
rate in the next two months. By matching survey responsesto adminis-
trative records, we show that employees who report that they savetoo
little actually do have low 401(k) saving rates. However, almost noneof
the employees who report that they intend to raise their savingrate in the
next two months actually do so.
This finding introduces a theme that we return to throughoutthe pa-
per. Specifically, at any point in timeemployees are likely to do whatever
requires the least current effort: employees often follow thepath of least
resistance. Almost always, the easiest thing to do isnothing whatsoever,
a phenomenon that wecall passive decision. Such passive decisionmaking
implies that employers have a great deal of influence overthe savings
outcomes of their employees. For example, employerchoices of default
saving rates and default investment funds stronglyinfluence employee
savings levels. Even though employees have theopportunity to opt out
of such defaults, few actually do so.
In section 3, the heart of our paper, we discuss the impactof changes in
seven different types of planrules. In section 3.1, we show that automatic
enrollment in a 401(k) plan dramatically raises participation rates,but
that the vast majority of employees accept the automatic-enrollmentde-
fault contribution rate and investment allocation. By contrast,before auto-
matic enrollment was instituted, few employees chose toinvest at these
defaults.
In section 3.2, we discuss the effects of automaticcash distributions for
terminated employees. We argue that automatic cashdistributions,
which are given to terminated employees with balancesbelow $5,000,
undercut retirement wealth accumulation. Most employeeswith bal-
ances below $5,000 who receivesuch automatic distributions consume
the proceeds. By contrast, most employees withbalances above $5,000
leave their money in the 401(k) plan. Hence, the automaticcash distribu-
tions seem to play a critical causal role in the consumptionof these low-
balance 401(k) accounts.
In section 3.3, we discuss different interventionsdesigned to raise
employee contribution rates. Benartzi and Thaler(2001b) have shown
that employees are willing to commit to automaticschedules of slow
401(k) contribution rate increases, and that committing tosuch a sched-Defined Contribution Pensions71
ule wifi result in substantially higher 401(k) savings rates after onlya few
years. We report an experiment of our own that shows that a savings
intervention that does not include such an automatic commitmentcom-
ponent is not successful.
In section 3.4, we discuss the effects of the employer match rate and
the employer match threshold (the maximum employee contribution
that the employer matches) on savings outcomes. We show that adopt-
ing an employer match can increase 401(k) participation, and that the
match threshold is an important focal point in the selection ofem-
ployee contribution rates. We also show that increasing the match
threshold can raise the contribution rates of individuals with lowsav-
ing rates.
In section 3.5, we discuss the impact of changes in eligibility waiting
periods on the 401(k) participation profile (i.e. participation rates plotted
against tenure at the job). We show that an increase in the length of time
before 401(k) eligibility truncates, but does not shift, the participation
profile.
In section 3.6, we discuss mutual-fund menus and the role ofem-
ployer, or "company," stock. We argue that themenu of asset allocation
options and the choice of the default asset allocation influence actual
asset allocation decisions and portfolio diversification.
Finally, in section 3.7 we discuss the role of financial education in the
workplace. Using data that link employees' receipt of financial education
to their actual saving behavior, we show that although many seminar
attendees plan to make 401(k) savings changes, very few actually doso.
Thus, while financial education does improve savings outcomes, its ef-
fects are modest at best.
We see passive decisionmaking in many of the behavioral patterns
described above. Passive decisionmaking partially explains the powerful
influence of defaults, the anchoring effects of the match threshold, the
remarkable success of automatic schedules of slowly increasing contribu-
tion rates, and the influence of mutual fund menus on asset allocation
decisions.
We conclude the paper by encouraging employers to implement
401(k) plans that work well for decisionmakers who oftenuse passive
strategies like those described above. Employers and policymakers need
to recognize that it is difficult to present a neutral menu of options fora
401(k) plan. Framing effects will influence employee choices, andpas-
sive employee decisionmaking implies that the default options will often
carry the day. Sophisticated employers will choose these defaults care-
fully, keeping the interests of both employees and shareholders in mind.72Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
2. SAVINGS ADEQUACY
In January 2001, we administered a savings adequacy surveyto a ran-
dom sample of employees at a large U.S. food corporation(Company A)
with approximately 10,000 employees. Of these employees,1,202 were
sent an e-mail soliciting their participation in aWeb-based survey on
satisfaction with various aspects of the company-sponsored401(k) plan.3
Because participation in the survey was solicited bye-mail and the sur-
vey itself was conducted on theWeb, the universe of potential respon-
dents is restricted to those with Internet access atwork.4
Our survey had two different versions. In this section, wediscuss the
savings adequacy version that was sent to 590 of theemployees with
computers. From this sample we received 195usable responses. A copy
of the complete survey is reproduced in Appendix B; wediscuss only a
subset of the questions in the analysis below. In addition tothe survey
responses, we also haveadministrative data on the 401(k) savings
choices of survey respondents both before and after the survey.This
includes participation decisions, contribution rates, and assetallocation
choices from January 1996 through April 2001.
We first asked respondents to report how much theyshould ideally be
saving for retirement.5 The average response is 13.9 percentof income.
We than asked respondents to evaluate their actual saving rate.Two-
thirds (67.7 percent) of the respondents report that their currentsaving
rate is "too low" relative to theirideal saving rate.6 One-third (30.8
percent) of the respondents report that their current saving rateis
"about right." Only 1 out of 195 respondents (0.5 percent) reportsthat
his or her current saving rate is "too high."
To evaluate how well individual perceptions of savingsadequacy cor-
relate with actual savings behavior, we report in Table 2 thedistribution
The solicitation included an inducement to actually complete the survey: two respon-
dents were randomly selected to receive gift checks of $250, and onerespondent was
selected to receive a gift check of $500.
" Naturally, restricting our sample to Internet users biases our sample toward employees
with greater financial sophistication. Our survey reveals that an employee'slevel of In-
ternet experience correlates with his self-reported financialknowledge. Likewise, home
Internet access also correlates with financial knowledge.
See question 10 from the survey (Appendix B).
6See question 11 from the survey (Appendix B). For our empiricalanalysis we aggregate
the categories "far too low" and "a little too low" into one category("too low"). Likewise,
we aggregate the categories "far too high"and "a little too high" into one category ("too
high").Defined Contribution Pensions73
TABLE 2.
Self-reported Retirement Savings Adequacy and the Distribution of
Actual 401(k) Contribution Rates (Company A)
Distribution of 401(k) Contribution Rates
as a Fraction of Income
5%-8% 9%-12%
Respondents who describe their 36% 36% 27%
savings rate as "too low"
Respondents who describe their 12% 15% 73%
savings rate as "about right"
See question 11 from the survey in Appendix B. We aggregate the categories "far too low" and "a little
too low" into one category ("too low").
of actual pre-tax 401(k) saving rates conditional on respondents' answers
to the savings adequacy questions discussed above. Since we use the
plan's administrative records, our analysis of actual 401(k) saving rates
does not suffer from reporting biases. We divide the actual pre-tax 401(k)
saving rates into three categories: 0 to 4 percent of income, 5 to 8 percent
of income, and 9 to 12 percent of income. Our scale tops out at 12 percent
because this is the maximum pre-tax 401(k) contribution rate in Com-
pany A. Among the respondents who said that their current saving rate
is "too low," 36 percent had an actual 401(k) saving rate of 0 to 4 percent,
another 36 percent had a saving rate of 5 to 8 percent, and 27 percent
had a saving rate of 9 to 12 percent. In contrast, among those who said
that their current savings rate is "about right," 12 percent had a 401(k)
saving rate of 0 to 4 percent, 15 percent had a saving rate of 5 to 8
percent, and 73 percent had a saving rate of 9 to 12 percent. These
comparisons reveal that respondents who report that their saving rate
is too low do have lower actual saving rates than respondents who
report that their saving rate is about right. In the former group the
average pre-tax 401(k) contribution rate is 5.8 percent of income, in
contrast to 9.0 percent in the latter group.
We also asked respondents to describe their plans for the future. None
of our respondents expressed an intention to lower their contribution
rate. But 35 percent of the respondents who said that their saving rate
was too low intended to increase their contribution rate over the next
few months. By contrast, 11 percent of respondents who said their sav-
ing rate was about right intended to increase their contribution rate over
the next few months. Among those who planned to raise their contribu-
tion rate, over half (53 percent) said that they planned to do so in the74Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
next month. Another quarter (23 percent) planned to make the change
within two months.
So far our data shows a familiar pattern. Respondents report that they
save too little and that they intend to raisetheir saving rate in the future.
Other savings adequacy surveys reach similar conclusions (Bernheim,
1995; Farkas and Johnson, 1997). Our survey is distinguished by our
ability to cross-check responses against 401(k) records. We have shown
that respondents who say that their saving rate is too low actually do
have substantially lower pretax 401(k) contribution rates. So their retro-
spective reports are accurate.
We have also checked to see whether their forward-looking plans are
consistent with their actual subsequent behavior. Of those respondents
who report that their saving rate is too low and that they plan to increase
their contribution rate in the next few months, only 14 percent actually do
increase their contribution rate in the four months after the survey.
Hence, we find that respondents overwhelmingly do not follow through
on their good intentions. In summary, outof every 100 respondents, 68
report that their saving rate is too low; 24 of those 68 plan to increase their
401(k) contribution rate in the next few months; but only 3 of those 24
actually do so. Hence, even though most employees describe themselves
as undersavers and many report that they plan torectify this situation in
the next few months, few follow through on this plan.
Needless to say, these data are hard to interpret. It's not clear what
subjects mean when they say that they save too little. It's also not clear
what subjects mean when they say that they intend to raise their contri-
bution rate in the next few months. However, this evidence is at least
consistent with the idea that employees have a hard time carrying out
the actions that they themselves say they wish to take. Employers seem
to be concerned about such failures. Many of the institutionalchanges
discussed below in Section 3 were initiated by plan administrators in an
effort to raise employee saving rates.
3. Seven Institutional Features of 401(k) Plans
In this section, we turn to an analysis of how several features of 401(k)
plans affect employee 401(k) saving behavior.
3.1 Automatic Enrollment
The typical 401(k) plan requires an active election on the part of employ-
ees to initiate participation. A growing number ofcompanies, however,
have started automatically enrolling employees into the 401(k) plan un-
less the employee actively opts out. While automatic enrollment is stillDefined Contribution Pensions75
uncommon, a recent survey indicates that its adoption has increased
quite rapidly over the past few years.7
The interest of many companies in automatic enrollment has stemmed
from their persistent failure to pass the IRS nondiscrimination rules that
apply to pension-plan provision. As a result of failing thesetests, many
companies have had to make either ex post 401(k) contribution refundsto
highly compensated employees or retroactivecompany contributions on
behalf of non-highly compensated employees in order tocome into com-
pliance. In addition, many companies have tried to reduce the possibility
of non-discrimination testing problems byex ante limiting the contribu-
tions that highly compensated employees can make. The hope ofmany
companies adopting automatic enrollment has been that participation
among the non-highly compensated employees at the firm will increase
sufficiently that non-discrimination testing isno longer a concern.
While some companies have been concerned about the potential legal
repercussions of automatically enrolling employees in the 401(k) plan,
the U.S. Treasury Department has issued several opinions thatsupport
employer use of automatic enrollment. The first Treasury Department
opinion on this subject, issued in 1998, sanctioned the use of automatic
enrollment for newly hired employees.8 A second ruling, issued in 2000,
further validated the use of automatic enrollment for previously hired
employees not yet participating in their employer's 401(k) plan.9 In addi-
tion, during his tenure as Treasury Secretary, Lawrence H. Summers
publicly advocated employer adoption of automatic enrollment.'0
A growing body of evidence suggests that automatic enrollmenta
simple change from a default of non-participation toa default of
participationsubstantially increases 401(k) participation rates." Toas-
sess the impact of automatic enrollment on savings behavior, we exam-
ine the experience of three large companies analyzed in Choi, Laibson,
Madrian, and Metrick (2001) that implemented automatic enrollment
between January 1997 and April 1998. Companies B and C implemented
In a recent survey, Hewitt Associates (2001) reports that 14 percent of companies utilized
automatic enrollment in 2001, up from 7 percent in 1999.
8 See IRS Revenue Ruling 98-30 (Internal Revenue Service, 1998).
See IRS Revenue Ruling 2000-8 (Internal Revenue Service, 2000a). See also Revenue
Rulings 2000-33 and 2000-35 (Internal Revenue Service, 2000b).
See "Remarks of Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers at the Department of Labor
Retirement Savings Education Campaign Fifth Anniversary Event" at http://www.ustreas
.gov/press/releases/ps785.htm along with related supporting documents.
" See Madrian and Shea (2001a), Choi, Laibson,Madrian, and Metrick (2001), Fidelity
(2001), and Vanguard (2001).76Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
automatic enrollment for new hires. Company D also implemented auto-
matic enrollment for new hires, but in addition subsequentlyapplied it
to non-participating employees who were401(k)-eligible at the time when
automatic enrollment was initially adopted.12
Table 3 illustrates the difference in 401(k) participation rates by tenure
before and after automatic enrollment. For each company, we report three
columns of figures. The first and second columns contain the fractionof
employees hired before and after automatic enrollment wasimplemented
who are 401(k) plan participants at six-month increments of tenure.'3The
third colunm differences these participation rates, yielding the incremen-
tal impact of automatic enrollment on plan participation.
In all three companies, 401(k) participation for employeeshired before
automatic enrollment starts out low and increases quitesubstantially
with tenure. At six months of tenure, 401(k) participation rates range
from 26 to 43 percent at these three companies. Participation ratesin-
crease to 50 to 62 percent at 24 months of tenure,and to 65 to 69 percent
at 36 months of tenure. The profile of 401(k) participationfor employees
hired under automatic enrollment is quite different. For these employ-
ees, the 401(k) participation rate starts outhigh and remains high. At six
months of tenure, 401(k) participation ranges from 86 to 96 percent at
these three companies, an increase of 50 to 67 percentage pointsrelative
to 401(k) participation rates prior to automaticenrollment. Because
401(k) participation increases with tenure in the absenceof automatic
enrollment, the incremental effect of automatic enrollment on401(k)
participation declines over time. Nonetheless, at 36 months of tenure,
401(k) participation is still a sizable 31 to 34 percentage pointshigher
under automatic enrollment.
While most companies that implement automatic enrollmentdo so
only for newly hired employees, some companies haveapplied automatic
enrollment to previously hired employees who have not yetinitiated
participation in the 401(k) plan. Choi, Laibson, Madrian, andMetrick
(2001) show that for previously hired employees at Company D, auto-
matic enrollment also substantially increases the 401(k) participation rate,
12Because of concurrent changes in eligibility for employees under the age of40 at Com-
pany D, we restrict the sample of employees in theanalysis at the company to those aged
40 or over at the time of hire. These employees were immediately eligible toparticipate in
the 401(k) plan, both before and after the switch to automatic enrollment.
13Because of differences in the available data from these companies, thenumbers are not
directly comparable across companies. For Company C, we have data on 401(k)participa-
tion on the data collection dates, and thus the numbers in columns 1 and 2for Company C
represent contemporaneous 401(k) participation rates. For CompaniesB and D, we have
data on the date of initial 401(k) participation, and thus the numbers in columns 1and 2 for

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































078Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
although the increase in participation is slightly smaller than that seen for
newly hired employees. Madrian and Shea (2001a) and Choi, Laibson,
Madrian, and Metrick (2001) also discuss how the effects of automatic
enrollment vary across various demographic groups. While automatic en-
rollment increases 401(k) participation for virtually all demographic
groups, its effects are largest for thoseindividuals least likely to partici-
pate in the first place: younger employees,lower-paid employees, and
Blacks and Hispanics.
One might conclude that since 401(k) participation under automatic
enrollment is so much higher than when employees must choose to
initiate plan participation, automatic enrollment "coerces" employees
into participating in the 401(k) plan. However, if this were the case, we
should expect to see participation rates under automatic enrollment de-
clining with tenure as employees veto their "coerced" participation and
opt out. But remarkably few 401(k) participants atthese companies,
whether hired before automatic enrollment or hired after, reverse their
participation status and opt out of the plan. In our three companies, the
fraction of 401(k) participants hired before automatic enrollment who
drop out in a 12-month period ranges from 1.9 to 2.6 percent, while the
fraction of participants subject to automatic enrollment who drop out is
only 0.3 to 0.6 percentage points higher. To us, this evidence suggests
that most employees do not object to saving for retirement. In the ab-
sence of automatic enrollment, however, manyemployees tend to delay
taking action. Thus, automatic enrollment appears to be a very effective
tool for helping employees begin to save for their retirement.
While automatic enrollment is effective in getting employees to partici-
pate in their company-sponsored 401(k) plan, it is lesseffective at moti-
vating them to make well-planned decisions about how much to save
for retirement or how to invest their retirement savings. Because compa-
nies cannot ensure that employees will cho9se a contribution rate or an
asset allocation before the automatic enrollment deadline, the company
must establish a default contribution rate and a default assetallocation.
Most employees follow the path of least resistance and passively accept
these defaults.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of 401(k) contribution rates at our
three companies for employees hired before and after automaticenroll-
ment. Because contribution rates may change with tenure, forall three
companies we have restricted the sample to employees hired beforeand
after automatic enrollment with equivalent levels of tenure.14 Allthree
14 In Company B, the sample is restricted to employees with 24-35 months of tenure; in
Company D to those with 0-23 months of tenure; and in Company D to those with 12-35
months of tenure.FIGURE 1. The Distribution of Contribution Rates of 401(k) Partici-
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companies match employee contributions up to 6 percent of compensa-
tion, the match threshold in Figure 1. But the default contribution under
automatic enrollment is much lower than this-2 percent in company B
and 3 percent in companies C and D. Before automatic enrollment, 63 to
79 percent of plan participants at these companies contribute at or above
the match threshold. Only 11 to 20 percent voluntarily choose the contri-
bution rate specified by their employers as the default under automatic
enrollment. In contrast, 42 to 71 percent of participants hired under
automatic enrollment contribute at the default rate, while only 26 to 49
percent contribute at or above the match threshold.
Automatic enrollment has similar effects on the asset allocation of plan
participants. Figure 2 shows the allocation of 401(k) balances between
stocks, bonds and the combination of stable value and money market
funds. Once again, because asset allocation may change with tenure, we
have restricted the sample to employees with equivalent levels of ten-
ure.15 In two of the three companies, the default fund under automatic
enrollment is a stable-value fund, while in the third it is a money market
fund. As Figure 2 shows, employees hired before automatic enrollment
have the majority of their plan assets (53 to 81 percent) allocated to the
stock market, and only a small fraction of their assets (10 to 18 percent)
allocated to stable-value or money market funds. These percentages are
15See footnote 14.80Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
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effectively reversed for employees hired under automatic enrollment. For
this group of participants, 48 to 81 percent of assets are invested in stable-
value or money market funds, a group that includes the automatic enroll-
ment default at all three companies, and only 16 to 51 percent of assets are
invested in the stock market. Overall, the fraction of assets allocated to the
stock market falls by 22 to 53 percentage points, while the fraction of
assets allocated to stable value funds or the money market increases by 31
to 71 percentage points. Choi, Laib son, Madrian, and Metrick (2001)show
that these effects are driven both by the conversion of would-be non-
participants to the defaults and by employees who would have partici-
pated in the absence of automatic enrollment but with different elections.
Given the evidence of delay in the election of 401(k) participation
before automatic enrollment shown in Table 3, one might speculate that
there is the same type of delay in the movement away from the default
contribution rate and asset allocation under automatic enrollment. Table
4 suggests that this is indeed the case. At six months of tenure, between
55 and 73 percent of participants contribute at the default and have their
assets invested wholly in the default fund. At 24 months of tenure, the
fraction of participants at the default falls to 40 to 51 percent, and at 36
months of tenure to 44 to 48 percent. So, with time, employees do move
away from the automatic enrollment defaults. Nonetheless,after three
years, almost half of participants are still "stuck" at thedefault.16
16Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2001) show that compensation is the strongest
determinant of how quickly employees move away from the automatic enrollmentDefined Contribution Pensions81
TABLE 4.
Fraction of 401(k) Participants at the Automatic Enrollment Default
The sample for Companies B and C is 401(k) participants hired after automatic enrollment. The sample
for Company D is further restricted to participants aged 40+ at the time of hire.
Taken as a whole, the evidence in this section indicates that defaults
can have a powerful effect on the nature of individual saving for retire-
ment. In terms of promoting overall savings for retirement, automatic
enrollment as structured by most employers is a mixed bag. Clearly auto-
matic enrollment is very effective at promoting one important aspect of
savings behavior, 401(k) participation. This simple change in the default
from non-participation to participation results in much higher 401(k)par-
ticipation rates. But, like companies B, C, and D, most employers that
have adopted automatic enrollment have chosen very low default contri-
bution rates and very conservative default funds (Profit Sharing/401(k)
Council of America 2001; Vanguard 2001). These default choices are incon-
sistent with the retirement savings goals of most employees.
This evidence does not argue against automatic enrollment as a tool
for promoting retirement saving; rather, it argues against the specific
automatic enrollment defaults chosen by most employers. Employers
who seek to facilitate the retirement savings of their employees need to
respond to the tendency of employees to stick with the default. Employ-
ers should choose defaults that foster successful retirement saving
when the defaults are passively accepted in their entirety. Automatic
enrollment coupled with higher default contribution rates and more
aggressive default funds would greatly increase wealth accumulation
for retirement.17 The results in this section also suggest an important
caveat in thinking about the design of personal accounts in a reformed
defaulthighly compensated employees tend to move away from the default more rapidly
than those with lower pay.




Company B Company C Company D
6 67.2 72.6 54.5
12 61.2 59.3 50.9
18 61.4 47.6 43.7
24 51.4 39.6 39.5
30 53.9 - 39.4
36 43.6 48.282Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
Social Security systemwhatever defaults are chosen will need to be
chosen carefully.
3.2 Automatic Cash Distributions for Terminated Employees
with Low Account Balances
Another aspect of 401(k) plan design that highlights the importance of
defaults on 401(k) savings outcomes is the treatment of the 401(k) bal-
ances of former employees. When an employeeleaves a firm, the em-
ployee may explicitly request a cash distribution, a direct rollover of
401(k) balances to an IRA, or a rollover to another employer's 401(k)
plan. If the terminated employee does not make an explicit request, the
balances typically remain in the 401(k) plan. Under current law, how-
ever, if the plan balances are less than $5,000and the former employee
has not elected some sort of rollover, the employer has the optionof
compelling a cash distribution.
To document the importance of this mandatory cash distribution
threshold, figure 3a and b plot the relationship between the size of 401(k)
balances and the likelihood that a terminated employee receives a distri-
bution from the 401(k) plan at Companies B and D. We consider the
experience of 401(k) participants whose employment terminated any
time during 1999 or January through August of2000.18 We order the
employees according to the size of their 401(k) balances and then divide
them into groups of 100. We then calculate the average balance size for
each group (the x axis, plotted on a log scale) and the average fraction of
employees who receive a distribution from the plan by December 31,
2000 (the y axis). The measure of 401(k) balances used on the x axis is the
average participant balance as of December 31of the year prior to the
year in which the termination occurred.19 This measureof balances is
likely to understate the actual balances of plan participants at the time of
termination because the incremental contributions made to an individ-
ual's account between December 31 of the previous year and the date of
termination are excluded (as are any capital gains or losses over this
period).
In both companies, around 90 percent of terminated participants with
prior year-end balances less than $1,000 receive a distribution subsequent
to termination. In contrast, in Company D, a rather constantone-third of
terminated participants with year-end balances greater than $5,000 re-
18This includes both voluntary and involuntary terminations.
19That is, employees terminated in 2000 have a balance measure from December 31, 1999,
while employees terminated in 1999 have a balance measure from December 31, 1998. We
use this measure of balances because it is the only measure that wehave in our data.FIGURE 3. Balance Size and the Likelihood of a 401(k) Distribution
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ceive a distribution. In Company B, this fraction is even lower, at about 18
percent, and there is some additional slight decline in the likelihood of
receiving a distribution with respect to balance size beyond the $5,000
threshold. Between $1,000 and $5,000 in year-end balances, the fraction of
terminated participants receiving a distribution falls rather steadily and
quite significantly at both companies. This reflects the decreasing likeli-
hood that terminated participants will have a final balance of less than
$5,000 that is subject to an involuntary cash distribution.
For example, consider an employee at Company D making $40,000 per
year who is contributing 6 percent of pay to the 401(k) planwith a 50-
percent employer match that is vested. If this individual leaves his job at
the end of August, the additional employer plus employee contributions
to the 401(k) plan wifi amount to $2,400. Assuming no net capital gains
or losses, this individual will face a mandatory cash distributionif his
prior year-end balances were less than $2,600 (because $2,400 plus any-
thing less than $2,600 will fall under the $5,000 distribution threshold). If
his prior year-end balances were higher than $2,600, however, the com-
pany would not be able to compel a cash distribution, because his total
balances subsequent to termination would exceed $5,000. Thus, employ-
ees with higher prior-year-end balances will be less likely to face an
automatic distribution upon termination, because they are more likely to
have had balance increases that bring them above the $5,000 threshold.
Of course, even in the case of an automatic cash distribution, the
former employee does have the option to roll the account balance over
into an IRA or the 401(k) plan of another employer, regardless of the size
of the account balance. But previous research suggests that the probabil-
ity of receiving a cash distribution and rolling it over into an IRA or
another 401(k) plan is very low when the size of the distribution is small.
Instead, these small distributions tend to be consumed.2° When employ-
ers compel a cash distribution and employees receive anunexpected
check in the mail, it is much easier to consume the distribution than to
figure out how to roll it over into an IRA or another employer's 401(k)
plan.
This default treatment of the account balances of terminated employ-
ees provides another example of how manyindividuals follow the path
of least resistance. When balances exceed $5,000, the vast majority of
employees leave their balances with their former employer, the least-
20Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998a) report that the probability that a cash distribution is
rolled over into an IRA or another employer's pian is only 5 to 16 percent for distributions
of less than $5000. The overall probability that a cash distribution is rolled over into an IRA
or another employer's plan or invested in some other savings vehicle is slightly higher at 14
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effort option. When balances are below $5,000 andare subject to a
mandatory cash distribution unless the employee elects otherwise,most
individuals receive an unsolicited check in the mail and thenconsume
the money rather than rolling it over into another type of saving plan
also the least-effort option.
This analysis suggests that the rollover provisions of the recently
passed Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA) wifi indeed increase retirement savings. Under thenew law,
if the account balance is between $1,000 and $5,000, employers willno
longer be able to compel a cash distribution if a former employee does
not elect a rollover; rather, employers will be required to establishan
IRA on behalf of participants if they choose not to maintain theseac-
counts (Watson Wyatt, 2001). Although this provision of the law does
not take effect until the Department of Labor issues final regulations
regarding implementation (something that is not required to happen
until 2004), firms need not wait until then to voluntarily adopt similar
measures. As with automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, default roll-
overs have also been sanctioned by the IRS.21 Such a change in the
default treatment of the small balances of terminated employees isa
simple step that would further enhance the retirement savings plans of
many individuals.22
3.3 Automatic Contribution Rate Increases
One 401(k) plan feature designed to capitalizeon the inertia described in
sections 3.1 and 3.2 is the Save More Tomorrow (SMT) plan developed
by Shiomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler (Benartzi and Thaler 2001b).
Under this plan, participants agree in advance that in the absence of
explicit action on their part, their 401(k) contribution rate wifi be in-
creased by a certain amount each time they receivea nominal pay raise
until it achieves a preset maximum. For example,suppose that a worker
agrees to have his contribution rate increased by 2 percentage points
each time he gets a raise. If the worker receivesone raise in each of the
following three years, then his contribution rate would risea total of 6
percentage points over this time period. This plan is carefullycon-
structed to make use of several themes in behavioral economics. By
22See IRS Revenue Ruling 2000-36 (Internal Revenue Service, 2000b).
We should note, however, that previous research also suggests that although small
distributions tend to be consumed rather than rolled over into other retirement savings
vehicles, these small distributions represent a small fraction of total retirement savings
(Poterba, Venti, and Wise, 1998a). Thus, while automatically rolling such distributionsover
into an IRA will undoubtedly increase retirement saving, its impact on aggregate retirement
saving is likely to be modest.86Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
requiring a present commitment for future actions, the SMT planallevi-
ates problems of self-control and procrastination. Andby increasing
contributions on dates of future salary increases, the effects of loss aver-
sion are mitigated, because workers will see little or no reduction intheir
nominal take-home pay. (This presumes that participants are subject to
money illusion.)
The striking results of the first experiment with the SMTplan are
reported in Benartzi and Thaler (2001b). This first experiment was con-
ducted at a mid-size manufacturing company. This company was expe-
riencing problems in getting low-salary workers to participateand
contribute at high levels to the 401(k) plan. To combat these problems,
the company hired an investment consultant to meet with employees
and help them plan their retirement savings. After an initial interview
with each employee, the consultant would gauge the employee's wifi-
ingness to increase his savings rate. Employees judged to have ahigh
willingness to save more would receive an immediaterecommendation
for a large increase in their savings rate. 79 workers fell into this group.
Employees judged to be reluctant to save more would be offeredthe
option of enrolling in the SMT plan. 207 workers fell into this group.
The version of the SMT plan that was implemented set up a schedule
of annual contribution rate increases of 3 percentage points. This is a
relatively aggressive implementation, as the annual nominal salary in-
creases at this company were only a little bithigher than 3 percent.
The results of the experiment show that the SMT plan can have an
enormous impact on contribution rates.Of the 207 participants offered
the SMT plan as an option, 162 chose to enroll. Furthermore, 129 of these
162 (80 percent) stayed with the plan through three consecutive pay
raises. At the beginning of the SMT plan, these 162 workershad an
average contribution rate of 3.5 percent; bythe time of their third pay
raise, these workers (including those that eventually dropped out)had
an average contribution rate of 11.6 percent.Recall that these original
207 participants were selected from a larger sample based on their rela-
tive reluctance to increase their savings rates. In comparison, 79workers
had indicated a willingness to increase their contributions immediately
and were never enrolled in the SMT plan; these workers increased their
average contribution rate from 4.4 percent to 8.7 percent overthe same
time period. Since it is reasonable to assume that this latter groupof
workers represents a more highly motivated group of savers than the
SMT-plan participants, the increases by the SMT-plan participants are
very striking. As a further comparison, considerthat the median 401(k)
contribution rate of participants in 401(k) plans in general is approxi-
mately 7 percent of pay (Investment Company Institute, 2000). Thus, theDefined Contribution Pensions87
SMT-plan participants went from half of this median contributionrate
before signing up for the SMT plan to a contribution rate 50percent
higher three years later.
Despite the clear success of the SMT plan in increasing contribution
rates, there remain several important caveats. First, the plan isnot
guided by any well-specified model of what ideal savings should be.
Even if we accept that cleverly designed commitment devicescan enable
workers to break from suboptimal behavior patterns, thesesame devices
may overshoot the optimal targets. Second, the increases in 401(k) contri-
bution rates may be offset by dissaving elsewhere.23 Although 401(k)
saving has many advantages, it may still be inefficient if it leads partici-
pants to increase high-interest credit-card debt. Also, we do not know
how much of the additional contributions were later reduced by plan
loans or hardship withdrawals. In a plan that does not havean employer
matchunlike the one used in the original SMT experimentit isnot
clear that increasing 401(k) contributions is alwaysa good idea. Notwith-
standing these caveats, the SMT plan is certainly a provocativeattempt
to use behavioral economics to increase savings rates, and the early
results are highly encouraging and deserve further study.
Our 401(k) survey (discussed in section 2) sheds lighton the mecha-
nisms that make the SMT plan work. We generated two versions ofour
survey. One version (already discussed above) asked questions about
both savings adequacy and intentions regarding planned future invest-
ment changes (e.g. plans to change the contribution rate and the asset
mix). We call this the savings-adequacy version. We also generateda
pared down version of the survey that containedno questions about
either savings adequacy or intentions. We call this the control version.
We randomly assigned the two different versions of thesurvey to employ-
ees, and we checked to see whether the savings-adequacy questionnaire
had an impact on subsequent 401(k) investment choices. In other words,
we looked to see whether the process of thinking about savings adequacy
and formulating one's future savings plans actually led toa greater pro-
pensity to subsequently increase (or decrease) one's saving rate.
It turns out that this attention manipulation hadno impact. In other
words, getting someone to think about his or herown savings adequacy
did not lead to any differential future behavior. This result shedssome
light on the success of the SMT plan. The SMT plan hasmany different
effects. It encourages employees to think about their savings adequacy.
See Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 1996) for a discussion of asset shifting and its
consequences for measuring 401(k) effectiveness. See Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996,
1998b) for evidence that asset-shifting effects are not large.88Choi, Laibson, Mad nan & Metrick
It also sets in motion a series of automaticcontribution rate increases.
Our survey experiment demonstrates that getting employees tothink
about savings inadequacy is not enough. Employees alsoneed a low-
effort mechanism to help them carry out their plans to increasetheir
contribution rate. The SMT plan provides exactly such a tool.
3.4 Matching
Although automatic enrollment and the SMT plan provide lotsof food
for thought, they are still relatively new 401(k)-planfeatures that have
yet to be adopted on a widespread scale. A more commonfeature of
401(k) plans is the employer match. For each dollar contributedby the
employee to the plan, the employer contributes a matching amount up
to a certain threshold (e.g. 50 percent of theemployee contribution up to
6 percent of compensation). Although the effectsof employer matching
on 401(k) participation andcontribution rates have been widely studied,
the conclusions from this research are decidedlymixed. This derives in
part from the inherent difficulties associated withidentifying the influ-
ence of matching on 401(k) savingbehavior.
In theory, introducing an employer match should increaseparticipa-
tion in the 401(k) plan. In practice, however, it isdifficult to disentangle
this effect from the potential correlation between the savingspreferences
of employees and the employer match. For example,companies that
offer a generous 401(k) match may attract employeeswho like to save,
biasing upward the estimated effect of an employermatch on 401(k)
participation.
Using cross-sectional data, Andrews (1992), Bassett,Fleming, and Ro-
drigues (1998), Papke and Poterba (1995), Papke (1995),and Even and
Macpherson (1997) all find a positive correlation between theavailability
of an employer match and 401(k) participation. Theresults are more
varied, however, in studies that attempt to control for thecorrelation
between the employer match and other unobservedfactors that affect
401(k) saving behavior. Even and Macpherson (1997) use aninstru-
mental-variables approach to allow for the endogeneity of the employer
match and still find a large positive effect of matching on401(k) participa-
tion. However, it is not clear that the firm characteristicsthey use as
instrumental variables are in fact uncorrelated with unobservable em-
ployee savings preferences. Because she useslongitudinal data on firms,
Papke (1995) is able to include employer fixed effects toallow for the
correlation between the employer match and other factorsthat affect
saving behavior. With the addition of these fixed effects, therelationship
between the employer match and 401(k) participation goes away,but
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age match rates, not marginal rates. Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998)
examine several years of individual-level data in a company whose
match rate varied from year to year with the company's prior-year profit-
ability. They also find no relationship between the match rate and 401(k)
participation. However, the transient nature of the match-rate changes
at this company make it difficult to extrapolate these results to the perma-
nent types of match changes that most companies are likely to consider.
The empirical evidence on matching and 401(k) contribution rates is
even less decisive than that on 401(k) participation, although in theory
the effects here are less straightforward as well. Whereas introducing an
employer match where there wasn't one before should lower the contribu-
tion rates of employees who were already contributing in excess of the
match threshold (an income effect), its impact on those previously contrib-
uting at or below the match threshold is ambiguous (opposing income
and substitution effects). The effects would be similar for increasing the
match rate while maintaining the same match threshold. Increasing an
existing non-zero match threshold while keeping the match rate constant
should have no effect on people contributing below the old threshold,
increase contributions for people at the old threshold (a substitution ef-
fect), have an ambiguous effect for people above the old threshold but at
or below the new threshold (opposing income and substitution effects),
and decrease contribution rates for people above the new threshold (an
income effect).
The actual empirical research on matching and 401(k) contribution
rates has focused largely on the relationship between the match rate and
average 401(k) contribution rates. Andrews (1992) finds that a higher
employer match rate reduces the average 401(k) contribution rate; Bas-
sett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) find no effect; Papke and Poterba
(1995) and Even and Macpherson (1997) find a positive relationship; and
Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) find a small but positive effect of the
match rate on average 401(k) contribution rates. Papke (1995) findsa
positive effect of the match rate on total employee contributions at low
match rates, but a negative effect at higher match rates. These disparate
results are perhaps not so surprising, given that theory has little tosay
about the effect of the match rate per se on the average 401(k) contribu-
tion rate.
In this paper, we are able to avoid some of the confounds of previous
matching studies by examining the individual behavior of participants
before and after permanent changes in the 401(k) match structure at two
companies. In these natural experiments, participant behavior before the
changes serves as a control for participant behavior after the changes.
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contribution rates rather than on the average 401(k) contribution rate
and show the importance of considering the match threshold, a facetof
employer matching largely ignored in previous research, as well as the
match rate.
The first company that we consider, Company B, increased its match
threshold on January 1, 1997, while keeping its match rate constant.
Before that time, union workers received a 50-percent match on the first
5 percent of income contributed to the 401(k) plan, while management
employees received a 50 percent match on the first 6 percent of income.
On January 1, 1997, the match threshold for union employeesincreased
to 7 percent, while that for management employeesincreased to 8 per-
cent. Contributions up to the new threshold werestill matched at 50
percent, although the match on the incremental 2 percentof the new
threshold was invested in employer stock, whereas the match up to the
old threshold had been, and continued to be, invested at the discretion
of the employee.
To examine the impact of this change in the match structure on401(k)
savings behavior, we utilize a combination of bothlongitudinal and
cross-sectional data. We have longitudinal data on the 401(k) contribu-
tion rate in effect on each day from March 31, 1996 to February 28,2000
for every worker who was enrolled in the 401(k) plan duringthat time.
We also have cross sections of all active employees at Company B at
year-end 1998, 1999, and 2000 that contain information on participation
status, original enrollment date, original hire date, anddemographics.
In order to assess the effect of the threshold change on participation,
we estimate a Coxproportional-hazard model of time from hire until the
date of initial participation in the 401(k) plan. We control forgender and
age (with both linear and quadraticterms), and also include a dummy
variable that equals 1 after the new threshold took effect (January 1,
1997). We exclude all employees hired before January 1, 1996, because
the company eliminated its length-of-service requirement for 401(k) par-
ticipation on that date. We also exclude employees hired afterDecember
31, 1997, because the company switched from a traditionaldefined-
benefit to a cash-balance pension plan at that time for newly hired em-
ployees. The first colunm of Table 5 presents the estimated hazard ratios
associated with each independent variable. As one might expect for a
change that does not affect the marginal incentives to participate inthe
401(k) plan, we find that this increase in the match threshold has no
significant effect on 401(k) participation.
We next look at the impact of the threshold change on 401(k) contribu-
tion rates. Figure 4 plots the distribution of contribution rates over time
for all workers who were contributing to the 401(k) plan on March 31,Coefficients estimated from a Cox proportional-hazard model of 401(k) participation with time-varying
covariates. For Company F, the sample is employees hired during 1996 or 1997 and still employed at
year-end 1998, 1999, or 2000. For Company F, the sample is employees hired on or after January 1,
1998 and still employed at year-end 1998, 1999, or 2000. In Company E, the variable threshold change is
a dummy variable that equals 1 after the match threshold was raised in Company G (on January 1,
1997). In Company F, match introduction is a dummy variable that equals 1 after the company match
was armounced to employees (on July 1, 2000). The reported coefficients are hazard ratios, with
corresponding z statistics in parentheses. 'indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from
unity at the 1-percent level.
1996. As workers leave the firm, they are dropped from the sample. The
switch from the old threshold to the new threshold is clearly apparent.
There is an immediate jump from the old threshold to the new threshold
when the change occurred in January 1997, and a continued slower
adjustment over the next three years as more and more people shift from
the old to the new threshold. This suggests that there is a strong substitu-
tion effect for contributors at the old threshold. In contrast, the fraction
of participants at the other contribution rates is fairly stable over this
entire period, implying only a very small income effect for contributors
above the old threshold.
The shift in contribution rates from the old to the new match threshold
may also reflect an "anchoring effect" of the match threshold. Specifically,
the match threshold serves as a salient starting point in the decision of
which contribution rate to select. Numerous studies have shown that final
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The second company that we consider is Company F, which intro-
duced a 25-percent match on contributions up to 4 percent of income on
October 1, 2000. We suspect that this was adopted as a response to the
fact that at year-end 1999, only 34 percent of its active employees had
ever participated in its 401(k) plan.24 Communication about thechange
started at the beginning of July 2000. Prior to this date, there was no
employer match offered in the plan.25
Our data include cross sections of all active employees at Company F
at year-end 1998, 1999, and 2000. These data contain information on
participation status, original enrollment date, effective year-end contribu-
tion rate, original hire date, and demographics. We exclude all employ-
ees hired before July 1, 1998, because on that date the company elimi-
nated a one-year length-of-service requirement for 401(k) eligibility.
To assess the impact of the employer match on 401(k) participation,
we again estimate a Cox proportional-hazard model of time from hire
until the date of initial participation in the 401(k) plan. As with company
24 We should note that Company F has a primary defined-benefit pension plan for its
employees.
The company did have three acquired divisions that had employer matches previously
and were not affected by this change. These divisions, as well as three divisions that were
acquired after 1998, are excluded from our analysis.
FIGURE 4. The Evolution of the 401(k) Contribution Rate Distribu-
tion over Time (Company E)
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we control for gender and age, and we include a dummy variable
that equals 1 after the match was announced to employees (July 2000).
Results are presented in colun-m 2 of Table 5. We find that introducing
the match has a positive and highly significant effect on participation,
with a z statistic of 6.84. In order to assess the economic significance of
the results, we plot in Figure 5 the predicted participation rate by
tenure for a hypothetical population of 40-year-old males. At three to
four months of tenure, the model predicts a 10.9-percent participation
rate when there is an employer match, which is 3.4 percentage points
higher than would be the case without an employer match. Results at
longer tenure levels are more speculative, because we don't actually
observe employees with more than three months of tenure who have
had the match in place since hire. Keeping this caveat in mind,we see
that the model predicts 17.8-percent participation at oneyear after
hire with an employer match (a 5.3-percentage-point increase) and
24.2-percent participation at two years of tenure (a 7.0-percentage-point
increase).
Although these numbers may seem small, note that this company had
unusually low participation rates to start with. When compared against
the baseline, the employer match appears to have increased 401(k) partici-
pation by over 40 percent. Furthermore, relative to the match structure
in other 401(k) plans, this employer match is not particularly generous.26
26The modal employer match is 50 percent of employee contributions up to 6 percent of
compensation (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1998).
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FIGURE 6. Employer Matching and the Distribution of 401(k)Contri-
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A higher match rate might be expected to have alarger effect on
participation.27
The introduction of a match seems to have had a meaningful effect on
the distribution of contribution rates as well. Figure 6 is a histogramof
contribution rates by hire cohort at the end of the calendar year in which
the cohort was hired.28 Before the employer match, the mostfrequently
chosen contribution rates of plan participants are 5, 10,and 15 percent
(which is lumped together with the 11- to 14-percent rates in thegraph).
After the employer match, we see a large increase in the fractionof
employees with a 4-percent contribution rate (the new match threshold)
relative to previous cohorts with the same tenure at the company.This is
consistent with our previous observation that the matchthreshold may
serve as a powerful focal point inemployees' choice of a contribution rate.
In sum, our limited evidence suggests that employermatching does
have a significant impact on both 401(k) participation andcontribution
rates. Company F demonstrates that implementing anemployer match
27However, Bassett, Fleming, and Rodrigues (1998) conclude that the mere presenceof a
match increases participation, with no marginal effect from increasing the match rate.We
cannot test this hypothesis with our data.
While the distribution of employees at the various contribution rates is based on thefull
sample of employees, not just plan participants, we have excluded thenon-contributors
from the graph, because they constitute over 90 percent of the sample, and includingthem
makes variation in contribution rates across the contributing populationdifficult to see.Defined Contribution Pensions95
can increase 401(k) participation. Company E demonstrates that increas-
ing the match threshold can increase 401(k) contribution rates. Both
Company E and Company F show that the match threshold hasan
important effect on the distribution of 401(k) contribution rates, with
many participants clustering at the threshold.
3.5 Eligibility
Another common 401(k)-plan feature is a waiting period before employ-
ees become eligible to participate in the plan. Employers adopt eligibility
requirements for a variety of reasons, including the fixed costs of admin-
istering accounts for newly hired workers with high turnover rates, and
the possibility that low participation rates of newly hired employees wifi
adversely affect an employer's non-discrimination testing. This latter
explanation, however, is less relevant as recent legislative changes have
made it easier for companies to institute shorter length-of-service require-
ments for 401(k) participation without substantially increasing the com-
pany's risk of failing non-discrimination tests.
Earlier eligibility is valuable for employees, since a shorter waiting
period increases their tax-deferred savings opportunities. The extent of
this benefit, however, depends on how waiting periods affect the partici-
pation profilethe relation between 401(k) participation and tenure. For
example, waiting periods may merely truncate the participation profile,
so that upon eligibility, employee participation quicidy catches up to
the participation rate that would arise without a waiting period. Alter-
natively, waiting periods may shift the participation profile, so that
employees who face a waiting period have permanently lower 401(k)
participation rates than those who do not.
In this subsection, we examine the effect of eligibility requirements on
401(k) participation in two companies that eliminated their eligibility
requirements. Both Company F and Company G went from a one-year
eligibility period to immediate eligibilityCompany F on July 1, 1998,
and Company G on January 1, 1997.29
To illustrate the impact of waiting periods on 401(k) participation, we
plot in Figure 7a and b the 401(k) participation profiles of employees who
faced either a one-year or no eligibility requirement. For Company F
(Figure 7a), the two groups are employees hired between July 1, 1996
and July 1, 1997 with a full one-year waiting period, and employees
Company C also subsequently changed the windows in which participants could enroll
in the plan. Prior to September 1, 1997, participants could enroll only once a year. Begin-
ning on November 22, 1997, however, new enrollments were allowed on a daily basis. To
the extent that these deadline changes affect the time path of participation, Company G's
results could be biased.96Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
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hired between July 1, 1998 and December 31, 2000, who faced no waiting
period. For Company G (Figure 7b), the two groups are employees hired
between January 1, 1995 and January 1, 1996 with a full one-year waiting
period, and employees hired between January 1, 1997 and December 31,
1999 with no waiting period.
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At both companies, the employees with a one-year waiting period do
not immediately attain the 401(k) participation achieved at equal tenure
by employees with shorter waiting periods, but thisgap closes fairly
quickly over time. If we assume that the participation seriesare drawn
independently, the differences between the twogroups are no longer
statistically significant at 18 months of tenure in Company F andat 22
months of tenure in Company G.
Another way to look at these participation profiles is to considerpar-
ticipation rates by the time since 401(k) eligibility. Doingso, we see that,
conditional on time since becoming eligible, employees witha one-year
eligibility requirement actually have a higher 401(k) participationrate
than employees who were immediately eligible. The difference inpartici-
pation rates is between 2.5 and 4.6 percentage points for Company F and
is always significant at the 1-percent level for the first twelve months
after eligibility. At Company G the difference is approximately 7percent-
age points and is almost always significant at the 1-percent level for the
first 24 months after eligibility. These findingsare inconsistent with the
notion that eligibility requirements simply shift the 401(k) participation
profile without affecting its shape.
Overall, the evidence from these two companies suggests that the
401(k) participation rates of employees who face eligibility requirements
catch up fairly quickly (within a matter of months) to levels that would
occur without waiting periods. While this is certainly better for retire-
ment wealth accumulation than would be the case if eligibility require-
ments resulted in permanently lower 401(k) participation rates,we do
not take this as evidence to suggest that waiting periodsare "not that
bad." Nobody seems to lose when shorter waiting periodsare adopted,
so we see no reason why companies should not be encouraged to allow
immediate eligibility for participation 401(k) savings plans.
3.6 Asset Allocation Choices
The bulk of this paper is focused on the 401(k) participation and contribu-
tion decisions of employees. If we are concerned about savings adequacy
at retirement, the questions of whether to participate in a savingsprogram
and how much to save conditional on participationare of primary impor-
tance. After these two questions have been answered, the next most
important question is how to allocate savings among different asset classes.A
small but growing literature has addressed these questions inrecent
years; not surprisingly, many of the same behavioral issues present in the
participation and contribution decisions also play a role in participants'
asset allocation choices. As discussed earlier, Madrian and Shea (2001a)
and Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick (2001) show thatautomatic98Choi, Liibson, Madrian & Metrick
enrollment results in many participants remaining atthe employer-
specified default for both the contribution rate and assetallocation.
Such passive decisionmaking in asset allocation choices isalso present
in many other guises. In a series of papers,Shlomo Benartzi and Richard
Thaler demonstrate several related behavioral regularities in assetalloca-
tion decisions. Benartzi and Thaler (2001a) studythe relationship be-
tween the menu of investment choices andthe eventual pattern of asset
holdings across different classes. They suggest that participants use na-
ive diversification strategies that are heavilyinfluenced by the menu
offered by their plan; a plan sponsor that offers ten equityoptions and
five non-equity options may be subtly influencing itsemployees to put
two-thirds of their money into equities. Using a databaseof 170 retire-
ment savings plans, Benartzi and Thaler(2001a) find that approximately
62 percent of the funds offered in these plans areequity investments; the
fraction of total assets held in equities by the participantsin these 170
plans is remarkably close to 62 percent as well.Furthermore, they find a
positive relationship at the plan level betweenthe fraction of equity
funds offered by the plan and the fraction ofindividual portfolios in-
vested in equities. These findings are further reinforced byexperimental
data and by evidence on individual decisionsmade by TWA pilots in
their corporate plan.
In another study, Benartzi and Thaler (2001c) gaveparticipants a
choice between the distribution of retirement outcomesimplied by the
actual asset allocation in their 401(k) plan and thedistribution implied
by the average allocation among all participants inthe same plan. Most
participants preferred the average distribution tothe one based on their
own allocation. Since mostparticipants have portfolios that are, almost
by definition, more extreme than the averageallocation, Benartzi and
Thaler characterize this result as an example of an aversion to"extreme-
ness." Such results call into question whether mostparticipants are
choosing an allocation that could be calledoptimal in an economic
framework.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of 401(k)participants' asset alloca-
tion choices is the large fraction of balancesinvested in employer stock.
About half of all 401(k) plans (by assets) offer participantsthe opportunity
to invest in company stock. Someplans even require that all matching
contributions be held in company stock, at least for someperiod of time.
Because this asset class is both very volatile (since itconsists of only a
single stock) and highly correlated with the labor earningsof employees,
holding company stock is certainly a poor diversification strategyfor
participants. Nevertheless, a significant fraction of plan assets areheld inDefined Contribution Pensions99
company stock. For firms that offer company stock in their plans,
Holden, VanDerHei, and Quick (2000) find that about 33percent of plan
assets are held in this asset class. Among all firms, including those that do
not offer company stock, this fraction is 18 percent.
While this level of holdings itself seems high, themanner in which
participants decide to invest in company stock is also troubling. Benartzi
(2001) finds that current contributions tocompany stock are heavily influ-
enced by the returns earned by that stock over the preceding tenyears.
It seems that naive diversification is combined with naive extrapolation
of past returns and an apparent lack of concern for the riskconsequences
of company-stock investment. Indeed, a first-order improvement in di-
versification could be gained by the simple elimination ofcompany stock
from 401(k) plans.
Interestingly, ERISA restricts the investments of defined benefitpen-
sion plans in the stock or real estate of the employer to 10% of total
assets. 401(k) plans, however, are exempt from this rule. The recent
collapse of Enron has publicly highlighted the diversification danger of
company stock in 401(k) plans. With several bills now pending before
Congress to address the diversification problems created by 401(k) in-
vestments in company stock, the current policy question has changed
from one of whether restrictions on 401(k) investments incompany stock
are warranted to what type of restrictions are warranted (and are polit-
ically feasible). While Enron is at the center of the public controversy,
class-action lawsuits have been filed by 401(k) participants at several
companies in the wake of dramatic declines in the value ofcompany
stock. Even absent legislative reforms, these lawsuitsare prompting
many other companies to reconsider the emphasis on company stock in
their 401(k) plans. While some companies are reevaluating whether they
should match in company stock, others are addressing whetherto elimi-
nate company stock as an investment option altogether.
3.7 Financial Education at the Workplace
Recognizing that many employees are ifi equipped to make well-
informed retirement savings decisions, particularly with respect toasset
allocation, many employers have turned to various forms of financial-
education provision to help their employees meet the challenges of plan-
ning for an economically secure retirement. These efforts, whichvary
widely across employers, run the gamut and include paycheck stuffers,
newsletters, summary plan descriptions, seminars, individual consulta-
tions with financial planners, and, more recently,access to Internet-
based education and planning tools.100Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
The previous literature on the effects of financial education on saving
behavior has found rather consistent evidence that financial education
increases savings, although the inadequacy of the data in manyof these
studies makes their conclusions somewhat speculative. There are two
broad strands in the literature. The first is case studies of the impactof
financial education at specific companies or organizations. These studies
typically evaluate the effect of a particular financial education initiative,
often financial education seminars, on either saving behavior or mea-
sures of financial well-being (Kratzer etal., 1998; HR Focus, 2000; De-
Vaney et al., 1995; McCarthy and McWhirter, 2000; Jacobius,2000).
While all of these studies conclude that financial education motivates
improvements in saving behavior, these conclusions are oftenbased on
dramatic changes in what participants plan to do with respect to retire-
ment saving without actually verifying that theprophesied changes
eventually do take place. Unfortunately, a growing body of both theoreti-
cal and empirical evidence, including the survey results reported in
section 2 of this paper, suggests that despite the best intentionsof em-
ployees, retirement saving is one area in which individuals excel atdelay
(Madrian and Shea, 2001a; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1998; Diamond and
Koszegi, 2000; Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998). Thus, measures
of intended behavior are likely to dramatically overstate the actualef-
fects of financial education.
The second broad category of analyses in the previous literature on
financial education has utilized cross-sectional surveys of individuals
from across the population, not just from a single company or organiza-
tion (Bernheim and Garrett, 1996; Bernheim, Garrett, andMaki 1997;
Milne, Vanderei, and Yakaboski, 1995), or data from surveys of multiple
employers (Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz, 1996; Milne, Vanderei,and
Yakaboski, 1996; Murray, 1999). This category of studies has the advan-
tages of applying to a general population and utilizingactual saving
choices instead of saving intentions.
However, the cross-sectional data sets also pose numerous problems.
Their greatest drawback is that financial-education provisionand/or utili-
zation may be correlated with other factors that have a stronginfluence
on saving behavior acrossindividuals or organizations (e.g. the structure
of the 401(k) plan, the availability of other types of savingsand/or pen-
sion programs, the level and structure of employee compensation,the
corporate culture). To the extent that these confoundingfactors are not
completely observed and controlled for, the measured effects of financial
education could be quite biased. The definition of what constitutes"fi-
nancial education" is also subject to interpretation and is likely to vary
from one respondent to another.Defined Contribution Pensions101
The household surveys have the additional disadvantagethat survey
answers to questions about financial education are likely to be subjectto
recall bias. This could result, for example, if individualswho participate
in and benefit the most from employer-sponsoredsavings programs find
financial education more salient andare thus more likely to remember
that such programs were offered. Thistype of non-random measure-
ment error in the availability of financial education wifi leadto estimates
of the effects of financial education thatare too large. The employer-
based surveys have the additional disadvantage thatresponse rates tend
to be quite low, and it is unlikely that thenon-response is random.
Moreover, it is almost impossible to determine how the selectionof the
firms into the sample is likely to affect the results.
A recent study by Madrian and Shea (2001b) examinesthe impact of
financial education seminars on saving behaviorin Company C, one of
the companies discussed in section 3.1. CompanyC enlisted a financial-
education provider to give one-hour seminarsat its various locations
throughout the country during 2000. The curriculumat these seminars
was general and covered topics directly related to retirement savings,
such as setting savings goals to meet retirement incometargets and the
fundamentals of investing (asset classes, risk, diversification,etc.), in
addition to more general financial issues suchas managing credit and
debt and using insurance to minimizeexposure to financial risks.
The financial-education data from thiscompany are unique in that
seminar attendance was tracked in a way that made it possibleto match
seminar attendance to administrative dataon both previous and subse-
quent saving behavior. We have data on the individuals whoattended
financial-education seminars between January 1 and June30, 2000, and
on the 401(k) saving choices of all employees at this companyon Decem-
ber 31, 1999, before any of the seminarswere offered, and on June 30,
2000, by which time the seminars had been offeredat 42 different loca-
tions. One-third of the employees at thecompany work at these 42
locations, and about 17 percent of employeesat these locations attended
the financial-education seminars.
Table 6 presents some very basic statisticson the planned changes in
saving behavior that attendees of the financial educationseminars re-
ported, along with the actual changes in saving behavior thatwere made
subsequent to the seminars. The statistics in Table 6 painta somewhat
more muted picture of the impact of financial education on saving behav-
ior than has been estimated in the previous literature. Inan evaluation
of the financial-education seminars given to attendeesat the conclusion
of the seminar, attendees were asked, "After attendingtoday's presenta-
tion, what, if any, action do you planon taking toward your personal102Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
TABLE 6.
Financial Education and Actual vs. Planned Savings Changes
(Company C)
The sample is active 401(k)-eligible employees at company locationsthat offered financial-education
seminars from January to June 2000. Actual changes in saving behavior aremeasured over the period
from December 31, 1999 through June 30, 2000. Planned changes arethose reported by seminar
attendees in an evaluation of the financial-education seminars at theconclusion of the seminar. The
planned changes from survey responses of attendees have been scaled toreflect the 401(k) participa-
tion rate of seminar attendees.
financial affairs?" followed by a list of choices (withmultiple responses
allowed). 71 percent of those attending the seminarsfilled out and
turned in these evaluation forms.3°
Of those who filled out the evaluation, 12 percentreported that they
intended to start contributing to the 401(k) savingsplan. But 88 percent
of seminar attendees were already participating inthe 401(k) plan, so
virtually all of the non-participating seminar attendeesplanned to enroll
in the 401(k) plan. By June 30, 2000, however,only 14 percent of the
non-participating seminar attendees had actuallyjoined the plan, and
some of these would likely haveenrolled in the 401(k) plan without the
availability of a financial-education seminar (as did 7 percentof the em-
ployees who did not attend the seminars).
Of those seminar attendees who were alreadyparticipating in the
plan, 28 percent reported plans to increasetheir 401(k) contribution rate,
41 percent reported plans to make changesin the selection of their
investment choices within the 401(k) plan, and36 percent reported plans
to change the fraction of their moneyallocated to the various 401(k)
investment choices. By June 30, 2000, however,only 8 percent of 401(k)
° The evaluation responses that we have are from all locations offering financial-education
seminars during 2000, not just those offering the seminarsduring the JanuaryJune 2000
period for which we have savings data. Unfortunately, we do nothave the evaluation
responses on an individual basis, only theaggregated responses for all attendees. Thus,
we cannot ascertain on an individualbasis how many seminar attendees actually followed
through on the planned behaviors listed on the evaluationform.
Planned action
Seminar attendees Non-attendees
Planned changeActual changeActual change
Non-participants:
Enroll in 401(k) plan 100% 14% 7%
401(k) participants:
Increase contribution rate 28% 8% 5%
Change fund selection 47% 15% 10%
Change fund allocation 36% 10% 6%Defined Contribution Pensions103
participants attending the seminars had increased their contribution
rate, 15 percent had made changes to their investment choices, and 10
percent had changed their fund allocations. While the fraction of semi-
nar attendees making such changes is slightly higher than the fraction of
non-seminar-attendees, it is substantially below what the attendeesre-
ported they planned on doing. One could certainlyargue that the low
rate of actual changes relative to planned changes results from the fact
that the data used to observe the plan changesare, for employees at
some locations, for times not long after the actual financial-education
seminars. However, there is relatively little correlation between the frac-
tion of seminar attendees making changes to their 401(k) saving behavior
and the length of time between their seminar and June 30, 2000.It
appears that seminar attendees make changes either almost immediately
or not at all.
Madrian and Shea (2001b) draw similar conclusions when theytry to
control for differences in the underlying saving propensities of employ-
ees who do and do not attend financial-education seminars. Their final
assessment is that financial education increases savings-plan participa-
tion and results in greater portfolio diversification, particularlyamong
employees hired under automatic enrollment, but the estimated magni-
tudes are not particularly large. Overall, while financial educationis
important, it does not appear to be a powerful mechanism forencourag-
ing 401(k) retirement savings.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The evidence discussed above provides an incomplete sketch of theretire-
ment preparation process. Our analysis only covers 401(k) savings and
necessarily misses other important types of wealth like home equity,
IRAs, and defined benefit pensions. However,even our incomplete evi-
dence provides intriguing hints about the economic and psychological
forces that drive financial planning.
Most of our evidence highlights the importance of passive decision-
making. For better or for worse, many householdsappear to passively
accept the status quo. For example, in companies without automatic
enrollment, the typical employee takes over ayear to enroll in his or her
company-sponsored 401(k) retirement plan. In companies withauto-
matic enrollment, employees overwhelmingly accept theautomatic-
enrollment defaults, including default savings rates and default funds.
For terminated employees, the key determinant of whether theycon-
sume or save their 401(k) balances is whether that balance is aboveor
below the automatic cash distribution threshold of $5,000. Manyplan104Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
participants allow the menu of investment funds todrive their asset
allocation decisions. Most employees feel that they save toolittle, and
many plan to raise theircontribution rate in the near future, but few act
on these good intentions.By contrast, employees do succeed in raising
their contribution rates if they are given a low-effortopportunity to sign
up for an automatic scheduleof increases in their contribution rate.
All of these examples have a common theme: employeesoften take
the path of least resistance. As a result, employershave a large measure
of control over the savings choices that theiremployees make. Most
savings plans an employer creates wifi advantagecertain passive or
nearly passive choices over other active choices.Sophisticated employ-
ers should choose their plandefaults carefully, since these defaults will
strongly influence the retirement preparation of theiremployees.
Policymakers should also recognize the role of defaults, sincepolicy-
makers can facilitate, with laws and regulations, thesocially optimal use
of defaults. For example, default contributions to companystock may
lead to insufficient diversification. Policymakerscould legally cap default
investments in such problematic asset categories.Likelihood, policymak-
ers could facilitate defaultcontributions to more appropriate invest-
ments, like the S&P 500, by giving corporationslegal protections for
picking such risky but highly diversified defaultfunds.
It is easy to identify dozens of ways thatthoughtful regulations can
influence passive decisionmakers without encroaching onthe freedom
of active decisionmakers to opt out of the defaultsand choose in their
own (perceived) best interest.However, regulating defaults is a two-
edged sword. If one has confidence in the government,then such regula-
tions wifi serve the common good. If one does nothave such confidence,
then regulating defaults will open up one more avenuefor the misuse of
governmental power. Our analysis demonstrates thatdefaults matter,
but our evidence does not reveal who shouldcontrol them.
APPENDIX A: DATA
This appendix describes the data for each of thecompanies analyzed in
this paper:
Company A. (1) Cross-sectional survey data from January2001 for a
random sample of employees; (2) longitudinal401(k) savings data
from January 1996 through April 2001 for all 401(k)participants.
Company B. Cross-sectional 401(k) savingsdata from December 31 of
1998, 1999, and 2000 for all active employees (both401(k) participants
and non-participants) and non-employee 401(k)-planparticipants.Defined Contribution Pensions105
Company C. (1) Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from June 1, 1997;
December 31, 1997; June 30, 1998; December 30, 1998; March 31, 1999;
June 30, 1999; September 30, 1999; December 31, 1999; March 31, 2000;
and June 30, 2000 for all active employees; (2) financial-educationsemi-
nar attendees from January 1, 2000 through June 30, 2000.
Company D. Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December31 of
1998 and 1999 for all 401(k)-plan participants (employee andnon-
employee), and from December 31, 2000 for all active employees (both
401(k) participants and non-participants) and non-employee401(k)-
plan participants.
Company E. (1) Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December31 of
1998, 1999, and 2000 for all active employees (both 401(k)participants
and non-participants) and non-employee 401(k)-plan participants;(2)
longitudinal 401(k) savings data from March 1996 through March2000.
Company F. Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December31 of
1998, 1999, and 2000 for all active employees (both 401(k)participants
and non-participants) and non-employee 401(k)-plan participants.
Company G. Cross-sectional 401(k) savings data from December31,
1999 for all active employees (both 401(k) participants andnon-
participants) and non-employee 401(k)-plan participants.
The cross-sectional data available for these various companiesinclude
basic demographic information (age, hire date, gender, income),as well
as point-in-time information on 401(k) saving such as participation sta-
tus, contribution rate, account balances, and asset allocation.
The longitudinal data include daily informationon the 401(k) contribu-
tion rate, account balances, and asset allocation of 401(k)-planpartici-
pants. They do not include demographic information or informationon
non-participating employees.
APPENDIX B: 401(K)-PLAN PARTICIPANT
SATISFACTION SURVEY QUESTIONS
Section I
1. Which of the following statements describes your current participa-
tion in the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) Plan?106Choi, Laibson, Madrian & Metrick
DI am currently contributing to the plan
DI am not currently contributing to the plan, but I havepreviously contributed
to the plan
DI am not currently contributing to the plan,and I have never contributed to
the plan
2. For each of the following questions,please indicate how strongly
you agree or disagree with respect tothe XXX Company, Inc. 401(k)
plan. To indicate your level of agreement, please usethe following
scale (if you have no experience with a given item,please respond
with "have no opinion").
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree




I have a good understanding of the 401(k) savingsplan overall
I have a good understanding of the 401(k) savingsplan investment
fund choices
I think the 401(k) plan meets my needs
The )OO( Company, Inc. 401(k) plan is better thanplans offered by
other companies
3. For each of the following questions,please indicate how satisfied
you are with that aspect of theXXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan. To
indicate your level of satisfaction, please use thefollowing scale (if








Convenience of payroll deductions for savings
Number of investment options
Variety of investment optionsAccount Statements
Internet access to your 401(k) plan
Loans
Please use the space provided to fill in yourresponse to the following
question:
4. What, if anything, could your company do differently interms of
the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan that would increaseyour satisfac-
tion level, relating to any of the items listed above?
Section II
Please check the appropriate box for each of the following questions:
5. How would you describe yourself as an Internet user?
E Very experienced
E Somewhat experienced
E Not too experienced
E Not at all experienced
6. Do you have access to the Internet at home?
L Yes
LNo
7. How would you describe your level of financial knowledge?
LI Very knowledgeable
LI Somewhat knowledgeable
LI Not too knowledgeable
LI Not at all knowledgeable
8. Which of the following best describes your job?
LI Management
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U Other salaried position
U Hourly
U Other
Which of the following best describes your level of education?





These next few questions discuss retirement savings. Please checkthe
appropriate box(es) for each of the following questions, and/orfill in
the blanks, as appropriate:
First, based on anything you may have heard or read, what percent
of your income do you think you should ideally be savingfor
retirement?
U 5 percent of income or less
U Between 5 percent and 9 percent of income
U Between 10 percent and 14 percent of income
U Between 15 percent and 19 percent of income
U Between 20 percent and 24 percent of income
U At least 25 percent of income
Think about how much you are actually currently saving for retire-
ment. Compare your actual saving rate to your idealsaving rate.
Right now, your actual retirement saving rate is:
U Far too low
U A little too low
U About right
U A little too high
U Far too high
IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOURCOMPANY
401(K) PLAN, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 12 THROUGH17.Defined Contribution Pensions109
IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COM-
PANY 401(K) PLAN, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 18.
Are you contributing currently at the maximum 401(k) savings rate?
Yes
LINo
Which of the following statements best describesyour 401(k)
contribution plans over the next few months?
LI I plan to raise my contribution rate.
LI I plan to lower my contribution rate.
LI I don't plan to make any changes.
IF YOU ARE NOT PLANNING TO MAKE ANY CONTRIBUTION
CHANGES, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 15.
What percent of your salary are you planning to contribute?
Which of the following statements best describesyour 401(k)
fund allocation plans over the next few months?
LI I am considering selecting different funds.
LI I am considering rebalancing among the funds I currently have.
LI I am not planning to make any changes in regard to my fund allocations.
LI I am considering both selecting different funds and rebalancingamong the
funds I currently have
When do you next plan to make changes in your 401(k) plan?
LI In the next few days
LI In the next week
LI In the next two weeks
LI In the next three weeks
LI Sometime in the next month
LI Sometime in the next two months
LI Other
What company resources will you use to make changes toyour
401(k) plan? Check all that apply.
LI Speak to benefit center representative110Choi, Lciibson, Madricin & Metrick
El Use the 401(k) web site
El Consult the new hire kit (given to all new employees)
El Other: Please specify
IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COMPANY
401(K) PLAN, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 21.
IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO YOUR COM-
PANY 401(K) PLAN, PLEASE ANSWER QUESTIONS 18 TO 20.
When you enroll/re-enroll in the XXX Company, Inc. 401(k) plan,
what percent of your salary do you expect to contribute to the plan?
El Between 0 percent and 3 percent of income
El Between 4 percent and 6 percent of income
El Between 7 percent and 9 percent of income
El Between 10 percent and 12 percent of income
El Between 13 percent and 15 percent of income
When do you plan to enroll/re-enroll in the 401(k) plan?
El In the next few days
El In the next week
El In the next two weeks
El In the next three weeks
El Sometime in the next month
El Sometime in the next two months
El Other
What company resources will you use to enroll in the 401(k) plan?
Check all that apply.
El Speak to benefits center representative
El Use the 401(k) web site
El Consult the new hire kit (given to all new employees)
El Other. Please specify
Thank you for your participation in this survey.
For more information on the )OO( Company, Inc. 401(k) plan,click here:
URL.Defined Contribution Pensions111
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